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DETHRONING STATE SECURITY: INTRODUCING A
HUMAN SECURITY PERSPECTIVE TO ABSORB
THE DANGERS OF CLIMATE CHANGE TO THE
SELF-DETERMINATION OF ISLAND STATE INHABITANTS

Anemoon Soete
One unmistakable and indisputable consequence of Climate Change is
found in the realm of oceans. Sea-levels are currently risingat a pace
unknown to mankind and as a consequence islandstates are destined to
lose habitableland territory. Whereas some may lose parts,others will
lose all of it in the current business as usual scenario. This realityfirst
begs the question as to whether an island state will continue to be a
state once bereft of a territorialbasis. Secondly, it must be considered
how islandersmight retainlegalpersonalityshould this is no longer be
possible through the institution of statehoodas it exists in positive law.
Donninga long-termperspective and taking into account the need for a
state to be an effective duty-holder.for its citizens, a state may arguably
no longer be an effective state when missing the statehood criterion of
habitable territory.However, this finding need not create a non liquet
situationwhere we can only point out a gap in law to stare at,or revert
to creative solutions such as recognizing deterritorializedentities as
states with permanent ex situ governments. When setting aside a
classicalapproachfocusingfixedly on ways to ensure state security, the
islanders' predicament can be viewed through a human security
approach,which taps into the humanized side of today's international
law and allows us to acknowledge that the islanders' situation is
embedded in much more than the lore of statehood With this
awareness, it can be concluded that to attempt retaining the legal
personality, cultural identity and effective empowerment of islanders
without an island-apeople's human right to self-determinationneeds
to take center stage.
INTRODUCTION

Climate change has a profound impact on our planet. One
unmistakable and indisputable consequence is found in the realm of
oceans. Sea-levels are currently rising at a pace unknown to mankind
and water has already engulfed islands-such as the Carteret Islands-
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to the extent of inundation or inhabitability due to complete
salinization. As an obvious consequence, island states are destined to
lose habitable land territory. 1 Whereas some may lose parts, others will
lose all of it in the current business as usual scenario. This first begs the
question as to whether such an island state will continue to be a state
once bereft of a territorial basis. Secondly, it must be considered how
islanders may retain their identity as a people if this is no longer
possible through statehood.
STATEHOOD EFFECTIVENESS

Regarding the first question, emerging statehood as we know
it today relates to the criteria of having a permanent population, a
government, the capacity to uphold international relations, and of
course a defined territory. Regarding the criterion of territory, state3
practice teaches us that territory need not reach a threshold of size,
nor need boundaries be fixed definitely 4 . In addition, recognition by
third states is a necessary confirmation of de facto statehood. These
1 The

population of all the islands called most threatened by the IPCC are those of

the Marshall Islands (73,376), Kiribati (106,925), Tuvalu (10,959), Tonga
(106,513), the Federated States of Micronesia (104,719), and the Cook Islands
(9,556) in the Pacific Ocean. That amounts up to 412.047. Also called threatened
by the IPCC are Antigua and Nevis (no data available) in the Caribbean Ocean;
and Maldives (392,960) in the Indian Ocean. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, WORKING GROUP II: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 935 (James McCarthy et al eds., 2001); Central Intelligence Agency, The
World Factbook 2016, https://www.cia.gov/libmry/publications/the-worldfactbook/
2 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, Dec. 26
1933,
165 L.N.T.S. 19.
3 See James Crawford, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 46
(Oxford Univ. Press, 2d ed. 2006).
4 See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 35
(Feb. 20).
5 Apart from having a mere declaratory value, such acts of recognition may bring
with it its own demands. In the process of creating the internationally administered
state of Kosovo, the European Community put forward several demands such as
general respect for human rights, which were deemed necessary for recognition of
Kosovo as a state. EC, Declaration on the 'Guidelines on the Recognition of New
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requirements receive validity through the principle of effectiveness.
Effectiveness serves legal order and derives from the fact that a state
arising from the will of the people and their right to self-determination must be able to represent its citizens' rights and entertain duties
as an international legal personality. Effectiveness ensures practical
usability of the notion of statehood.6 An effective state is a necessary component in the chain of command to enforce law for its citizens, as there exists no comprehensive international law enforcement mechanism. This means that according to current positive
law, a state must have a certain degree of effectiveness and that
degree of effectiveness is reached through having a territory, population, government and capacity to enter into international relations,
and declarative recognition by third states.
However, the threshold of fulfilment of the de facto criteria
for statehood and concomitant effectiveness is much lower for the
existence and continuity of a state, in comparison to the emergence
of a state. 8 This low threshold boosts state continuity and maintains
legal stability. Retraction of recognition of an entity as a state is not
a likely occurrence. This is a primary reason failed states, those fully
lacking the criterion of government, are still regarded as states by
the international community irrespective of the fact that for an
undetermined period of time, effectiveness has taken the backseat.
In addition, a notion of legality prevents statehood discontinuance in
obvious cases of breaches of international law, most likely in cases

States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union' (16 December 1991), 31 ILM
1485 (1992), p.1487.
Robert H. Jackson,

6

QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

AND THE THIRD WORLD 23 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990).
7 Anne Peters, Statehood after 1989: 'Effectivitds' between

ality, in

Legality and Virtu-

SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW 171, 172 (James Crawford & Sarah Nouwen eds., vol. 3, 2010).
8 It must however be noted that also during cases of state creation, a partly faulty
or non-independent government is at times accepted to satisfy the demand of
effectiveness sufficiently (e.g. Republic of Congo). JAMES CRAWFORD, THE
CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

2006).

57 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2d ed.
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of illegal annexation (e.g. Baltic States9), despite the fact that all
control over the territory is lost for an unforeseeable period of time.
Hence, as the aforementioned examples demonstrate, a temporary
deviation from a sufficient degree of effectiveness is tolerated in
positive international law. In such situations, recognition acts as a
stopgap to impede loss of statehood. However, a permanent deviation from a sufficient degree of effectiveness-such as losing territory permanently-is likely unacceptable since this would amount to
a permanent deviation from effective statehood. 10
Current doctrinal considerations of the island states' future
have continuously focused on retention of the islands' statehood
with or without territory.1 1 The first solution, i.e. in which the island
state's land is artificially restored or replaced, firmly clings to the
principle of effectiveness. The second solution, i.e. wherein an
island state remains a state in a deterritorialized form, essentially
trades effectiveness for practicality or legitimacy. For both solutions
statehood is maintained. Unfortunately, the first solution or artificial

9When forcibly annexed by the Soviet Union for a period of over 50 years. When
the Soviet Union broke apart, the Baltic States were viewed by other states as
continuing their legal personality as it was before the illegal annexation.
10 Marek ascribes a permissible departure from Montevideo criteria and the
effectiveness principle to the obvious temporariness of such a deviation. Krystyna
Marek, IDENTITY AND CONTINUITY OF STATES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
102 (Librairie E. Droz 1954). On forming a resolution on 'La reconnaissance des
nouveaux Etats et des nouveaux gouvernements' the discussion on article 5 on the
recognition of a state demonstrates a useful consideration. The discussion concluded that a restriction on the irrevocability of recognition could only disappear
in the case of a definitive disappearance of one of the statehood elements. Hence it
was to be understood that the addition of the word 'definitive' was to be
understood to avoid "que l'article 5 ne s'applique A un Etat victim de troubles
passagers."Emphasis added. Institut de droit international, Annuaire de l'Institut
de droit international, Session de Bruxelles, Volume II 208-252 and 301
(Goemaere, Imprimeur de Roi April 1936).
" See for example Jane McAdam, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 2012), Maxine Burkett, The Nation ExSitu: On Climate Change, DeterritorializedNationhood, and the Post-Climate
Era,2 CLIMATE LAW 1 (Fall 2011).
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12
island solution represents a permanent cost many island states
cannot bear.
The deterritorialized solution seems incompatible with the
theory on statehood as it stands today and would at most amount to
the original island state's government functioning ex situ, providing

predominantly diplomatic protection for its diasporic population, as
current states provide for nationals abroad. 13 This solution is
oriented towards keeping islanders on their island as long as possible and once the situation becomes untenable, ensuring-currently
absent 14 --migration possibilities for the population which remain
citizens of the uninhabitable submerged island state. The two
solutions focus solely on defending state security. However, given

the problems a state security approach brings along, a solely statefocused approach may be deemed to fall short in today's humanized
international legal world which no longer focuses only on states as
the core subjects of international law, but also on individuals and
peoples as such. The emphasis in finding a solution for the islanders
needs to include attention for communities, and embrace the human

security perspective alongside a state security perspective, in order
to deepen our understanding of all potential scenarios for the island
states. Hence, this article situates itself within the hypothesis that
12

Nevertheless Island states which may be economically powerful enough can

indeed expand or replace their territory with the construction of artificial islands,
such as the Maldives have done with the artificial island of Hulhumal. Indeed
some projects find external funding such as a coastal protection project in Tuvalu.
See http://www.greenclimate.fund. However funding for such projects is often out
of reach of or insufficient for economically less advantaged states, especially when
international funds such as the Global Environmental Facility, Adaptation Fund
and Green Climate Fund which are receiving a lot less money than third states are
pledging to contribute to it. International Bar Association, UN SpecialEnvoy Mary
Robinson on the Urgent Need for Action on Climate Change, 68 No. 6 IBA
GLOBAL INSIGHT 12.
" Jane McAdam, 'Disappearing states', Statelessness and the Boundaries of
International Law, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 105, 116 (Jane McAdam ed., 2010).
14 See, e.g., Ioane Teitiota v. Chief Exec. of the Ministry of Bus., Innovation and
Employment [2015] NZSC 107 (SC) (where the court declined to recognize a
Kiribati national as a refugee fleeing from the inundation of the island Kiribati due
to climate change).

32

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vols. 24-25

when a state is permanently without a territory, it can no longer be
effective and as a result can no longer be recognized as a state in
positive international law for those without the capacity to recreate
habitable territory in a sustainable manner. In the sections which
follow it is explored how to consider the island states' future from a
non-state-centered focus. By demonstrating first and foremost that
we have truly left the realm of an international community dominated by states. Secondly, it will be demonstrated that the concept of
human security perfectly fits within the needs of today's international community. Finally, it is explored why the right to selfdetermination can be the core of a people-oriented solution for
submerging island states.
HUMANIZED INTERNATIONAL LAW

Today, we are far removed from the Westphalian world of
1648, and even from the world of unison created through the
conception of the United Nations. By no means have individuals
taken over the place of states as the grundnorm of international law,
but principles of cooperation and solidarity, human rights of all
generations, international criminal law, the responsibility to protect,
international humanitarian law and disaster response law herald a
time wherein the individual and the community are no longer
rendered invisible by the shadows of the state at the international

level. 15

15 See THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED PAPERS OF
ANTONIO CASSESE (Paola Gaeta & Salvator Zappali eds., Oxford University Press
2008) & Gerhard Hafner, THE EMANCIPATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL FROM THE
STATE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw, 315-51, (vol. 358, Acaddmie de droit

international. Recueil des cours 2011) for a discussion of the role of and protection
for the individual in international law.
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A Brave New World: Cooperation, Solidarity, and Human
Rights
With the United Nations arrived an era of explicit emphasis
on international cooperation. 16 In matters of environment the principle of cooperation has time and time again been endorsed. 17 Moreover, for environmental management it has been proven that transnational cooperation, especially regarding shared resources, is a
preferred and more beneficial strategy than clinging to compartmentalized territorial integrity. This indicates that sole governance over
territory need not trump cooperative environmental governance and
protection. 18 Particularly in the context of climate change, the
UNHCR stated that "[i]nternational human rights law complements
the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change by underlining
that international cooperation is not only expedient, but also a

16

Cf. U.N. Charter arts. 1 & 59, 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031; see also U.N.

Secretaiy-General, In larger freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human
Rights for All,
32-114, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (May 26, 2005).
17 Paras. 5, 7, 13, 24 and 27 Rio Declaration (13 July 1992) U.N. Doc.

A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I); Arts. 4, 5 and 6 of the United Nations Convention on
climate change (9 May 1992) 1771 U.N.T.S. 107; Art 5 Convention on
Biodiversity (5 June 1992) 1760 U.N.T.S 79; Arts. 4, 14 and 16 Prevention of
transboundary harm from hazardous activities (ILC 1997); Principles 22 and 24
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the human environment (16 June
1972), U.N. Doc A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1972); Paras. 5, 41 and 42 U.N. General
Assembly Res 46/182, Strengthening the coordination of humanitarian assistance
of the United Nations, (19 December 1999), Annex; Para. 4 and art. 7 and 8 ILC
Draft Articles on the protection of persons in the event of disasters, 2016, report of
the ILC, A/71/10. Para 4, U.N. General Assembly, I International Year of Water
Cooperation, 2013, 11 February 2001, A/RES/65/154. The need for co-operation

has been confirmed in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case (1969) ICJ 3,
§101 (C) regarding issues of delimitation.
18 See Alexander L6pez, Environmental Transborder cooperation in Latin
America: Challenges to the Westphalia Order, in GLOBAL ENVRIONMENTAL
CHANGE AND HUMAN SECURITY. 291, 292-93 (Richard A. Matthew et al. eds.,
2010).
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human rights obligation." 19 20 A binding duty to cooperate with one
another is nevertheless not adequately defined in international law.
Closely related, the principle of solidarity can be noted in the
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 59/193 on the "Promotion of a
Democratic and Equitable International Order" in which is stated
that "[s]olidarity, as a fundamental value, by virtue of which global
challenges must be managed in a way that distributes costs and
burdens fairly, in accordance with basic principles of equity and
social justice, and ensures that those who suffer or benefit the least,
receive help from those who benefit the most., 2 1 Solidarity is a
concept which increasingly pops-up in international law. It is
referred to directly in the Desertification Convention,2 2 the ILC
Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disaster
(DAPPED) 23 and indirectly in the Rio Declaration, the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD). 24 Solidarity has roots reaching to times
of natural law. In the words of de Vattel, "when the occasion arises,
every Nation should give its aid to further the advancement of other
'9 UNHRC,

Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner For Human

Rights and Reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the SecretaryGeneral, A/HRC/10/61 (15 January 2009).
20 For references to cooperation in human rights documents See: Arts.
2, 11, 15, 22
and 23 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. An actual
reference to a "duty to co-operate" is mentioned in principle 4 Declaration on
principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation
among states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, U.N. General
Assembly Res. (XXV) (24 October 1970), Annex.
21 G.A. Res. 59/193, Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International
Order, at 3 (Feb. 8 2002).
22 United Nations Convention to
Combat Desertification in Countries
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification art. 3, § b, Oct. 14, 1994,
1954 U.N.T.S. 3.
23 Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters,
with
Commentaries atIts Sixty-Eighth Session, [2016] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 2, U.N.
Doc. A/71/10. Preamble § 4.
24 See U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, 5, A/CONF. 151/26 (Vol. I), annex I (Aug. 12,
1992); Convention on Biological Diversity art. 1, openedfor signature Jun. 5,
1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change pmbl. 6, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
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Nations and save them from disaster and ruin, so far as it can do so
without running too great a risk [... ]. To give assistance in [... ] dire

straits is so instinctive an act of humanity that hardly any civilized
Nation is to be found which would refuse absolutely to do so...
Whatever the calamity affecting a Nation, the same help is due to
it.,,25

Though solidarity may appear to be a vague concept and
difficult to put to use, the major asset of solidarity lies in its flexible
and spontaneous character. After all, the concept can be found in a
most practical form in the Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS),
which dictates that persons and ships in distress at sea must be
helped out. 26 This particular notion of assistance is also described in
and Rescue (SAR) 27

International Convention on Maritime Search
and International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) 28 which were amended after the Tampa incident2 9 to
impose "coordination and cooperation" of member states so that
picked up passengers could be brought ashore a safe place as soon
as possible, regardless of the nationality of those rescued.30

25

Emmerich de Vattel, LE DROIT DE GENS OU PRINCIPES DE LA Loi NATURELLE

(vol. 1, Carnegie Institution 1916) (1758)

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 98, Dec 10, 1983, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3.
27 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, ch. 3, Apr. 27 1979,
1403 U.N.T.S. 23489.
28 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, ch. 5, reg. 33, Nov. 1
1974, 32 U. S.T. 47.
29 In 2001, the Norwegian cargo ship 'Tampa' heeded a call of the Australian
Rescue Coordination Centre, went off course and rescued 430 Afghan migrants
from a sinking ship. When the Tampa, a ship designed to hold a maximum of 50
persons, tried to make port at the closest safe location which was Christmas
Island-which is part of Australian territory-the Australian government refused
the Tampa to enter Australia's territorial maritime zone. This incident led to
international dismay regarding the actions of Australia and to growing reluctance
of private vessels to participate in rescue missions.
30 Int'l Mar. Org. [IMO], Guidelines on the Treatmentof PersonsRescued at Sea,
26

at 1, Res. MSC. 167(78) (May 20, 2004), http://www.imo.org/en/Knowledge

Centre/IndexoflMOResolutions/Maritime-Safety-Committee(MSC)/Documents/MSC. 167(78).pdf.
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Finally, let us not forget about the increasing influence of the
vast international and regional human rights bodies of law which
have upgraded individuals and groups from objects to subjects of
international law.3 1 Indeed, regional courts such as the European
Court for Human Rights and the Inter-American Court for Human
Rights are available for individuals to bring claims, just as much as
the International Criminal Court is able to bring criminal individuals
to justice. Furthermore, human rights have had an influence on
international criminal law by being able to offer concrete remedies
to individuals, for example through the 2006 Basic Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law.32 33
Law in Times of Disaster
When it comes to disaster law, times of war spring to mind.
International Humanitarian Law (1IHL) is a well-settled part of
international law regulating jus in bello conduct. IHL sprung from
old codes of conduct and ad hoc traditions and currently forms a part
of customary international law, and is codified in the four Geneva
Conventions ('49) and Protocol I and II ('77). 1IL protects those
struck by war but are innocent of partaking in it. IHL is the poster
child for representing the customary principle of humanity that
condemns unnecessary suffering of people. Owing to IHL,
combatants are obliged to see their captured enemies no longer as
just enemies, but also as humans.
International Disaster Response Law (IDRL) is a much
newer addition to international law. It is not set in times of war as is
1IL, but in times of peace and unintentional catastrophe. Here, the
31

G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948);

G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 6, 1966).
32 G.A. Res. 60/147 (March 21, 2006).
33
M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Recognition of Victims' Rights, 6 HuM.
RIGHTS REV. 203, 278 (2006).
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object is to alleviate suffering of those innocent in producing the
catastrophe such as a natural hazard in the form of an earthquake,
hurricane or tsunami, and even manmade disasters such as nuclear
outbreak, or a mixed origin disaster such as climate change. Due to
the broadness and often lack of precise causal link between damage
and wrongdoer, IDRL has a hard time developing into maturity and
hard law. The UNHCR indeed confirms protection issues brought
on by natural disaster are less visible34 despite being omnipresent.35
Already in 1999, Kofi Annan pointed out how the international
community cherry picks the crises tackled.36 Time and time again
calamitous events occurring through (man-induced) natural disaster
are treated as a lower priority disaster, though baby steps to progress
are visible.
Following U.N. General Assembly resolutions, 3,7 the nonbinding Inter-Agency Standing Commission Operational Guidelines
on the Protection of Persons in Situations of Natural Disasters? 8 the
Red Cross' Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation
of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance,39
and the 2003 Bruges Resolution,40 the International Law
Commission's Draft articles on the Protection of Persons in the

3'

Elizabeth Burleson, Climate ChangeDisplacement to Refuge, 25 J. ENVTL. L. &

LITIG. 19, 22 (2010).
35 U.N. High Comm'r, Note on International Protection,

63, U.N. Doc.

A/AC.96/1085 (June 30, 2010).
36 Press Release, Secretary-General,

Secretary-General Presents His Annual
Report to General Assembly, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/7136 (Sept. 20, 1999).
37 See G.A. Res. 75/43, Humanitarian Assistance to Victims of Natural Disasters
and Similar Emergency Situations (Dec. 8, 1988). See also G.A. Res 68/43,
Humanitarian Assistance to Victims of Natural Disasters and Similar Emergency
Situations (Dec. 14, 1990).
38 INTER-AGENCY

STANDING COMM. IASC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES ON THE
OF PERSONS IN SITUATIONS OF NATURAL DISASTERS. (The

PROTECTION
Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 2011).

39 INT'L FED'N OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOC'YS, INTRODUCTION TO THE
GUIDELINES FOR THE DOMESTIC FACILITATION AND REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RELIEF AND INITIAL RECOVERY ASSISTANCE (2011).
40 Inst. of Int'l Law Res., Humanitarian Assistance (Jan. 9, 2003).
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Event of Disaster (DAPPED)4 1 can be viewed as a tool that may
lead to legally binding steps which point out that in certain situations
state sovereignty should be pierced for reasons of humanity. The
draft articles are innovative and refreshing in the sense that they
focus strongly on preventive action in the spirit of the Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction.4 2
Furthermore, DAPPED distinctly takes into account multiple
interests throughout its text, i.e. of both state and victims, making it
a balanced text. In addition, DAPPED focuses on both manmade
and natural disaster as well as mixed origin disaster.43 Equally, its
scope includes slow-onset and sudden-onset disaster,4 4 excluding
armed conflict already covered by humanitarian concepts such as
1IL. IHL has priority over DAPPED, 45 and is it unfortunate to see
that armed conflict and other causes of disaster are once again split
up entirely when they ultimately have the same goal of victim
protection. 46 Though DAPPED does not carry a specified duty to
provide assistance, the articles have inched closer to that line of
thought by providing a procedural obligation for other states, the
UN, and assisting actors in general to give due consideration to
specific requests of assistance from affected States.4 7 In the past, the
41

Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, with

Commentaries atIts Sixty-Eighth Session, [2016] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 2, U.N.
Doc. A/71/10.
42 U.N. World Conference, Sendai Frameworkfor DisasterRisk Reduction 2015
2030, 32 (Mar. 18, 2015).
43 DraftArticles on the Protection ofPersons in the Event ofDisasters,supra note
41, at art. 3, § 4.
44 Id.
45 Id. at art. 18.2.
46 See Sandesh Sivakumaran, Arbitrary Withholding of Consent to Humanitarian
Assistance in SituationsofDisaster,63 INT'L &CoMP. L.Q. 501,
514 (despite differences in situations of armed conflict, and situations of disaster,
"the underlying issue is the same"). Another example of putting the underlying
goal first can be found in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, which protects those with disabilities "in situations of risk, including
situations of armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies and the occurrence of
natural disasters". See G.A. Res. 61/106, at art. 11 (Dec. 13, 2006).
4' DraftArticles on the Protection ofPersonsin the Event ofDisasters,supra note
41, at art. 12.2.
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U.N. General Assembly has held that "the abandonment of the
victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations without
humanitarian assistance constitutes a threat to human life and an
offence to human dignity. 48 Simply refusing to aid those in need is
deemed unacceptable as well by SOLAS with regard to its duty to
aid those in distress at sea. In light of this, the masters of the ship
need to put in the log book precisely why they were unable to aid
those in distress. Furthermore, the master of the ship is responsible
to treat those who have embarked the ship with humanity. 49 Though
states have mixed feelings towards DAPPED, they have been a truly
significant step towards securing human dignity, 50 and dealing with
disaster in times of peace, 51 a matter insufficiently covered by hard
international law.52
A State Inherent Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
Long before the current R2P concept, a group of doctorsthe founders of Mdcins sans frontikres-pushed the term "droit
48

G.A. Res 75/43, supra note 37,

8.

'9 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Chapter V, Regulation
33, 2004.
50 Int'l Law Comm'n, Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters Comments
and Observations Received from Governments and International Organizations,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/696 (Mar. 14, 2016); Int'l Law Comm'n, Protection of Persons
in the Event of Disasters Additional Comments and Observations Received from
Governments, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/696/Add.1 (Apr. 28, 2016).
5 Especially given failed previous attempts of the U.N. to speed up codification in
the 1984 Draft Convention on Expediting the Delivery of Emergency Relief. See
U.N. Secretary-General, ProposedDraft Convention on Expeditingthe Delivery of
Emergency Relief U.N. Doc. A/39/267/Add.2 (June 18, 1984). This haphazard
way of regulating is the core reason for DAPPED.
52 See BUDISLAV VUKAS, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN CASES OF EMERGENCY.
(Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2013). Besides the
guiding principles on the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance in
G.A. Res. 75/43, supra note 37, and the annex of G.A. Res. 78/46, Strengthening
of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations
(Dec. 19, 1991), ad hoc solutions are usually present. For example, G.A. Res.
64/250, adopted on Jan. 22, 2010, is entitled Humanitarian Assistance, Emergency
Relief and Rehabilitation in Response to the Devastation of the Earthquake in
Haiti.
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d'ing~rence" or "'duty of intervention". In humanitarian crises, the
rights of victims needed to stand front and center, and not classical
State sovereignty. Despite the desire to make the right to intervention a human right, this duty of intervention was left ambiguous, it
was generally understood as a moral obligation incumbent on third
53
parties beyond the affected state to provide assistance to victims.
With this legacy, the present day notion of R2P emerged from a
realization that states needed to "embrace the responsibility to
protect, and when necessary ... act on it.",54 R2P has a broader function than humanitarian intervention in that it focuses on preventive
intervention and keeps use of force as a last resort. It also has a more
narrow scope in that it is strictly limited to protect populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity,
and their incitement.55 This responsibility to protect is a secondary
one for third states,56 and only a primary responsibility for the
affected state which has the duty to protect its population against
atrocities. As mentioned, R2P functions within a pre-disaster or
preventive timeframe. However, R2P also functions during the
disaster or reactive phase, and in the post-disaster or rebuilding
phase.5 7 Furthermore, R2P does not receive its strength from U.N.
mandates or international treaties, it is a sovereign responsibility
inherent to all states.
Of course, it must be remembered that R2P was put in place
for internationally well-recognized crimes and that the 'responsibility to protect' still does not offer a clear duty to protect. Prior to the
emergence of R2P, in the Kosovo debate-wherein the illegal
NATO intervention was a great stimulant for R2P, only Belgium
wanted there to be a general norm permitting intervention, other

Mario Bettati & Bernard Koucher, LE DEVOIR D'INGERENCE: PEUT-ON LES
LAISSER MOURIR? 22, 271 (1987).
51 U.N. Secretaiy-General, In largerfreedom: towards development, security and
human rightsfor all, 135, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005).
55 G.A. Res. 61/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, 138 (Oct. 24, 2005).
56 Nevertheless, in practice this secondary responsibility is not supported globally
51

and knows only a few true supporters.
57 G.A. Res. 60/L. 1, 2005 World Summit Outcome,

74, 97 (Sept. 20, 2005).
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NATO members agreed there is only a possibility of a moral duty to
act or a necessity.58
Though there are safety measures for unwillingness to act,
they are not perfect. If the affected state does not act, then U.N.
Security Council, U.N. General Assembly, and regional organizations are next in line.5 9 In this respect it is worth mentioning the
conclusions of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change, created by the U.N. Secretary General. The panel was mandated to examine contemporary global threats and future challenges
to international peace and security, including the connections
between them; to identify the contribution that collective action
could make in addressing these challenges; and to recommend the
changes necessary to ensure effective collective action, including a
review of the principal U.N. organs. In 2004, the panel endorsed
"the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing
military intervention as a last resort.",60 The panel also took the
suggestion of the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty to heart which indicated that self-discipline of the
permanent members in exercising their veto would be necessary.6 1
HUMAN SECURITY

Labels are powerful tools in the creation of law and policy.
Security situations may bring with it out-of-the-ordinary solutions,
when ordinary solutions bring no relief How a problem is labeled
and approached, is crucial for how it can be managed. If we
bifurcate security, we wind up with the more traditional notion of

51 Jutta Brunnde & Stephen Toope, Norms, institutions and UN Reform: The
Responsibilityto
Protect,2 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 121, 123 (2005).
59
Id. at 124.
60 Rep. of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More

Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565,
2004).
61

Brumne & Toope, supra note 58, at 125.

203 (Dec. 2,
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national state security 62 on the one hand and human security on the
other. Both state and human security can encompass a wide range of
issues such as environmental, minority group issues, and-predominantly-military issues.

63

Human security means ensuring security from a people's
perspective, instead of from a state-focused perspective. It must be
understood that human security is complementary to state security.
Human security broadens the focus of security from states and borders and moves it onto communities within and across those borders.6 4 Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy put it correctly
when he stated that, "human security is perhaps best understood as a
shift in perspective
or orientation. It is an alternative way of seeing
65
the world.,

Today much contemplation is given to retention of statehood
of flooding island states, whereas given the concerns of the islanders
about loss of their culture due to climate change,6 6 attention is due
retention of cultural identity and the community cohesion of the
islanders.6 7 Human security, as opposed to state security, supports
such a take on the issue. The concept can be traced back to the 1994
UNDP Human Development Report, though its meaning was far
from steady at that point.6 8 Proof that the concept was not a passing
62

Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Forced Migration: Refugees, Rights and Security, in

1, 2 (Jane McAdam ed.,
2008).
63 "The main focus of security studies is easy to identify, however: it is the
FORCED MIGRATION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY

phenomenon of war." Stephen M. Walt, The Renaissanceof Security Studies, Int'l
Stud. Q. 211, 212-13 (1991); Astri Suhrke, Human Security andthe Protection of
Refugees, in

REFUGEES

AND

FORCED DISPLACEMENT:

VULNERABILITY, AND THE STATE,

Selm eds., 2003).
Comm'n on Human Sec.,

64

65

HUMAN SECURITY Now,

CAN. DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

FOR PEOPLE IN A CHANGING WORLD,
66 See infra note 99.

67

INT'L

SEC.,

HUMAN

93, 94-95 (Edward Newman & Joanne van
&

INT'L TRADE,

§ 3,

6 (2003).
HUMAN

SECURITY: SAFETY

1 (1999).

See Tony Weir et al., Social and CulturalIssues Raisedby Climate Change in

Pacific Island Countries: An Overview, 17 REGIONAL ENvTL. CHANGE 1017,
1012-13 (2016).
6' Human security is described as a "concern with human life and dignity". U.N.
DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994, 22 (1994),
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fad came from then U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who
pointed out in 2000 that human security had already joined the main
U.N. agenda items of peace, state security and development.6 9
What's in a name?
In 2012, the U.N. General Assembly agreed upon a definition of human security. It is an approach-not a process on its
own-to assist Member States to address cross-cutting challenges to
the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people. 70 It is obvious
human security has grown from the previously discussed aspects of
a humanized international order. As a result, human security features
interfaces with these aspects. For one, just as traditional IHL, human
security is about the survival of people. Differently from IHL however, is that as human dignity stands at the core of human security,
human security goes beyond securing mere survival.
The human security approach must be people-centred,
context-specific and prevention-oriented in order to strengthen
protection and empowerment of people and communities. Indeed,
different from TDRL is the fact that human security protection places
itself largely in the preventive timeframe 7 1 and not the reactive one.
As mentioned, human security is far from a one-sided concept. For
example, when transboundary mass migration hits a third state's
population, human security concerns are present not only for the
displaced, but equally for the receiving state,7 2 hence prevention is
indeed crucial.7 3
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr 1994 en complete nostats.
pdf. The Commission on Human Security later describes it as an approach to
"protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms
and
69 human fulfilment." HUMAN SECURITY Now, supranote 64, at 4.
HUMAN SECURITY Now, supra note 64, at 4.
71

See G.A. Res. 66/290, Follow-up to paragraph 143 on human security of the

2005 World Summit Outcome (Oct. 25, 2012).
71

HUMAN SECURITY Now, supranote 64, at 11.

As two interests of self-determination would clash.
73 Nicholas Thomas & William T. Tow, The Utility of Human Security:
Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention, 33 SECURITY DIALOGUE, 177, 179
72

(2002).
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As mentioned, R2P is a system of "bridging the gap between
nation state system of political management and the global nature of
risks and threats requiring cooperation and collaboration. ,74 R2P as
such should not be expanded to encompass consequences of slow
onset natural disaster, or as a way to intervene in the policy of a state
refusing to limit climate pollution, but to unbundle it and use its
legitimate underlying values by putting people first.7 5 Indeed, much
like R2P, human security too puts people before state structures and
at the heart of foreign policy. 76 Human security looks at the international community as an important secondary player when an
affected state fails to protect its people.77 In order to fulfil this
secondary role, regional and international cooperation are vital. 78
Much ado about nothing?
Human security has received its fair share of criticism and
interpretations. It has been labeled as an annihilation of the intellectual coherence of security that need only focus on threats of war
on the state.79 It has received the label of only being appropriate to
focus on the basic needs of individuals as a minimum. 80 Finally, the
concept has been called fuzzy, 81 unnecessary, 82 weak, 83 and most of

7'Lloyd Axworthy & Allan Rock, R2P: A New and UnfinishedAgenda, 1 Global

Resp.
to Protect 54,68 (2009).
75
Id. at 65.
76 Rep. of the Int'l Comm'n on Intervention & State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect,6 (2001). Though four years later, the UNGA World Outcome
document of 2005 diminished this moralistic tone slightly.
77 The Responsibility to Protect,supra note 77, at 17.
78 G.A. Res. 66/290, 2005 World Summit Outcome (Oct. 25, 2012), supra note 70.
79 Stephen M. Walt, The RenaissanceofSecurity Studies, 35 INT'L STUD. Q. 211,
213 (1991).
Lloyd Axworthy, Canada and Human Society: The Need for Leadership, 52

80

INT'L J. 183, 184 (1997).
81

Astri Suhrke, Human Security andthe Protection ofRefugees, supra note 63, at

104.
2
Id. at 103.
83 Edward Newman, Refugees, Security, and Human Vulnerability: Introduction
1

and Survey, in

REFUGEES

AND

FORCED

DISPLACEMENT:

INTERNATIONAL
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all having too broad a scope.8 4 The last comment points out a
concern not to be underestimated, and presumably one of the
reasons why human security is often pushed aside too readily. It is
part of the reason why R2P was eventually so strictly delineated to
five core crimes. However, whereas R2P has the ambition of being a
policy in itself, human security remains an approach which for
obvious reasons is much broader than a specific policy. The concept
also knows constraint. A word of warning has been added by states
feeling threatened that human security by adding to the text that at
all times R2P must respect sovereignty, territorial integrity, and noninterference for matters within the domestic jurisdiction of states. In
addition, human security must not impose any new legal obligations
on the part of states,85 which it does not do given the nature of the
concept as an approach supporting existing rights and duties of
states and people with a special focus on human rights.
Human Security Meets Climate Change
The human security approach is intended to be applied for critical

and pervasive threats or situations. One of the threats envisioned is
massive population movements created by climate change. 86 Such
threats may be sudden, but can also creep in with slow onset. Like87
wise, threats can be orchestrated, inadvertent, direct, or indirect.
An indirect threat may grow due to insufficient support of the
international community in supporting those displaced, especially
due to slow onset events which were a long time coming. It is
important that slow onset events are taken into account, as today

SECURITY, HUMAN VULNERABILITY, AND THE STATE 16 (Edward Newman &
Joanne van Selm eds., United Nations University Press, 2003).
84 Indeed, human security has been described as to include issues ranging from
AIDS to the use of light weapons or landmines and peace resolution. Barnett et al.,

Global EnvironmentalChange andHuman Security: An Introduction,in
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND HUMAN SECURITY 15 (MIT Press, 2010).
85

G.A. Res. 66/290, 2005 World Summit Outcome (Oct. 25, 2012), supranote 70.

Comm'n on Human Sec., HUMAN
17Id. at 11.
86

GLOBAL

SECURITY

Now, 47 & 52 (2003)
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these feature much less in disaster law. 8 Finally, there is no doubt
human security is applicable to climate change issues, as already
human security approaches are utilized in tackling climate change
on a smaller scale, usually in close cooperation with local government. The human security approach was for example applied in
tackling recurring droughts exacerbated by climate change. In 2011,
a programme was launched in the north-east of Kenya and its border
communities. By considering a people-centered approach, it was
recognized that a primary concern was to ensure there would be no
competition between neighboring communities over the limited
resources during droughts. Hence a platform was constructed which
enabled combining resources and capacities of communities and
institutions to stabilize fragile livelihoods and prevent competition.8 9
Power to the People
Naturally, in a humanized world order, human security seeks
to support human rights and strengthen human development.
Importantly, human security does not attempt "to securitize human
rights issues, but rather to humanize security." 90 After all, human
security arose to reorient security around the individual at a time
when transnational norms of human rights started to emerge. 91 An
example of such arising norms can be found in a speech from U.N.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1999 when he said that "[t]he
88

Sebastian Albuja & Isabel Cavelier Adarve, Protecting People Displaced by

Disastersin the Context of Climate Change: Challenges from a Mixed Conflict/
DisasterContext, 24 TUL. ENvTL. L.J. 239, 244 (2011).
89
United Nations Human Security Unit and United Nations Food and Agricultural
Organization, Human Security and El Nino/ La Nina: Towards a New Response
Framework for Recurring and Extreme Weather Events 4 (2016). Furthermore, at
COP21 and the conclusion of the Paris Agreement, the U.N. Secretary-General
launched the Anticipate, Absorb and Reshape (A2R) initiative to strengthen the
ability of states to anticipate hazards, absorb shocks, and reshape development to
reduce climate risks. See: A2R: Anticipate, Absorb, Reshape 2, http://www.
a2rinitiative.org/.
90 Dorothy Estrada-Tanck, HUMAN SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (Bloomsbury Publishing 2016).
91 Edward Newman, supra note 83, at 7.
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State is now widely understood to be the servant of its people, and
not vice versa. At the same time, individual sovereignty-and by
this I mean the human rights and fundamental freedoms of each and
every individual as enshrined in our Charter-has been enhanced by
a renewed consciousness of the right of every individual to control
his or her own destiny. [... ] The Charter is a living document, whose
high principles still define the aspirations of peoples everywhere for
lives of peace, dignity and development. Nothing in the Charter
precludes a recognition that there are rights beyond borders. 92
Truly accommodating this collective interest is to accept that
individual security or human security in the broader sense 93 means
human security must trump the more traditional notion of state
security without overwriting it 94 . Hence the protection of individual
human rights stands front and center 95 in order to protect "communities ' 96 as well and to empower both categories to act on their own
behalf.97 A human right which can bring empowerment to threatened
communities such as those of the islanders is the right to selfdetermination. 98

Press Release, Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to General
Assembly, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/7136 (Sept. 20, 1999).
93 Unlike Troeller, I do not equate individual security to human security
as I
believe the former term does not cover the collectivity of people represented in
human security. Gary G. Troeller, Refugees and Human Displacement in
Contemporary International Relations: Reconciling State and Individual
Sovereignty, in REFUGEES AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT: INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY, HUMAN VULNERABILITY, AND THE STATE 64 (Edward Newman &
Joanne van Selm eds., United Nations University Press, 2003).
9'Unlike what Suhrke seems to suggest, I put forward that we must be wary of
forcing the choice of states to choose either for state security or human security.
The concepts are complementary, not exclusive. Astri Suhrke, Human Security
andthe ProtectionofRefugees, supra note 63, at 94.
92

95

Id. at 99.
HUMAN SECURITY Now,
97
96

supranote 64.
1d.
98 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 art. 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, art 1.
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SURVIVAL THROUGH EMPOWERED SELF-DETERMINATION

Recently, a study on linkages between climate change and
migration was conducted by the United Nations University Institute
for Environment and Human Security in Nauru, Tuvalu and Kiribati.
The research concluded that "[o]ne of the more striking results from
the Q study is the possible impact of migration on identity and
culture." 99 Several 'attitudes' were distilled from the replies received
from interviewees and indeed in almost every attitude the interviews
considered future migration to have an impact on their culture and
identity as a people. In addition, 7 out of 10 attitudes considered this
impact to be negative, none considered it positive, 3 out of 10
considered it neutral or did not mention it. As can be deduced from
this study, the inhabitants of the low-lying island states are most
worried about how to preserve their culture and identity if climate
change makes their land uninhabitable. Another study by Jane
McAdam, an authority in the field of migration, reaches the same
conclusion based on the interviews conducted by her. She adds that
the interviewees from Kiribati and Tuvalu do not link sovereignty to
borders, but rather to religious, tribal, landholding and language
groups. 100 The core value a human security approach supports more
fully than a state security approach is a people's human right to selfdetermination which underwrites the retention of a people's
uniqueness as a people, which is a major concern of the islanders.
Regarding its precise legal scope, self-determination has
grown through the years. Self-determination sprung from Woodrow
Wilson's words as a political statement, 10 1 and although unrecognized by the League of Nations, it was already put to use in the 1920

99 Campbell, J., Oakes, R., and Milan, A. (2016). Nauru: Climate change and
migration-Relationships between household vulnerability, human mobility and
climate change. Report No.19. Bonn: United Nations University Institute for
Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS
100 Jane McAdam, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION,
LAW 156 (Oxford Univ. Press 2012).
101 See Woodrow Wilson, FourteenPoints (Jan. 8, 1918).
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Aaland Islands case 10 2 and was used to support a decolonization
policy. 103 The right to self-determination became recognized by the
United Nations in the U.N. Charter 10 4 and was understood to go
beyond decolonization. 01 5 This was confirmed by embedding the
right in the 1966 human right covenants, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 10 6 and the International
10 7
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
According to the Human Rights Committee, the human right as
described in article 1 ICCPR, especially paragraph 3, "imposes
specific obligations on States parties, not only in relation to their
own peoples but vis-a-vis all peoples which have not been able to
exercise or have been deprived of the possibility of exercising their
right to self-determination." 10 8 This reading of article 1 corresponds
with the Friendly Relations Declaration by the U.N. General
Assembly in which was stated that "Every State has the duty to
promote, through joint and separate action, realization of the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." 10 9
Furthermore the right was confirmed to function erga omnes in the
102

First Report of the Int'l Comm. of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the

League of Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Op. Upon the Legal
Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question, League of Nations Official Journal,
Special Supp. No. 3 (1920).

G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples (Dec. 14 1960). The Security Council equally recognized
the right to self-determination in 1963 and 1965. See S.C. Res. 183 (1963); S.C.
103

Res. 218 (1965).

104 U.N. Charter
105 The right to

art. 1, 2.
self-determination was clearly included in agreements not at all
related to decolonization such as Organization for Security and Co-Operation in
Europe, Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe: Final Act of
Helsinki, August 1, 1975.

G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), supra note 31.
id.
10' Human Rights Committee, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 9 at 6 (1984). Note that the obligation is valid
vis- I-vis all peoples; not simply those residing within a respective state's territory.
Id.Note also that the cause of deprivation is necessarily requested. Id.
109 G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970).
106
107
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ICJ East Timor judgment1 10 as well as the ICJ advisory opinion on
the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory."' Due to its erga
omnes status, a people's right to self-determination is part of

113
112
international customary law, and even part ofj us cogens.
Many a definition has been proffered regarding the content
of self-determination itself The U.N. Charter has not done much to
help this complication by only mentioning the principle of selfdetermination of peoples in the Charter. 114 The Charter's preparatory works however do stipulate that the principle of self-determination implies the right to self-government, but not a right to secession
115
if self-determination would be exercised within an existing state.
Indeed, only such a principle seems enforceable. Though U.N. resolutions and declarations have continued to confirm and solidify the
right to self-determination, it has not succeeded in entirely clarifying
its contents. 116 The ICJ has referred to self-determination as the
"freely expressed will of peoples." 117 The ICPPR offers the following definition: "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and

110

Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. Rep. 90

(June 30).
. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 §155 (July 9).
112
Id. at § 157.
113 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility
of States for
Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 112, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10. Though opposition exists, indeed several claim self-determination is a
peremptory norm. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (Oxford Univ.
Press, 2d ed. 2001); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 808 (6th ed.
Cambridge Univ. Press 2008); J. Crawford, Third Party Obligations with Respect
to Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 32, Advisory
Opinion,
24 Jan. 2012.
11
4 U.N. Charter art. 1.2; U.N. Charter art. 55.
15 Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization,
Vol. VI, Comm'n I, Gen. Provision, at 296, U.N. Doc. 343, I/1/16, (May 15,
1945). Furthermore, seeing how the principle of self-determination implies the
right to self-government, it appears the principle of self-determination is more than
a merely political principle as it encompasses a right.
116 See, inter alia, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 103; G.A. Res. 2625
(XXV).
117 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. Rep. 12 § 59 (Oct. 16)
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freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." 118 In
order to secure economic, social, and cultural development, the right
to use of their natural wealth and resources as part of customary
law, 119 is inherent to peoples and their right to self-determination. 120
Of course, today's principle of territorial integrity ensures that this
right to self-determination remains
limited by the right of self12 1
determination of other peoples.
Who are 'we, the people'?
Who as a 'people' are the beneficiaries of the right to self122
determination, remains a matter of dispute in international law.
From its preparatory works, it is obvious the U.N. Charter distinguishes between Peoples, Nations, and States. Whereas 'State'
refers to a type of political entity, 'Nation' is a term which can be
used for any political entity, states and non-states. Finally, in a rather
broad interpretation, 'Peoples' was viewed to refer to groups of
human beings which may but do not need to comprise states or
nations. 123 Hence the Charter speaks rather of political entities and
groups of human beings, rather than persons in a particular geographically delineated area. Initially, the ICCPR crippled the broad
definition of 'Peoples' of the Charter. At the very least state
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1,Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
118

119

Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep.

Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 16 § 244 (Dec. 19). And as also
found in International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
120 G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, (Dec.
14, 1962); G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), supranote 31.
121 External self-determination resulting in increased autonomy of the people may
however be justified if the people is severely suppressed.
122 In contemplating the 'peoplehood' of East Pakistanis by the Commission of
Jurists, the Commission decided upon relevant characteristics of people. The list
ranged from historical, ethnic, cultural, ideological, geographic, economic to
quantitative characteristics. This already rather broad list was considered nonexhaustive, and no element of it considered essential.
123In the verbatim records of the U.N. Charter, States, Nations, and Peoples are
three distinct subjects.
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inhabitants and colonized people would qualify as peoples, though
the human rights covenants excluded minorities, therein including
indigenous peoples. 12 4 Indigenous peoples and minorities have
12 5
remained nebulous categories of alleged peoples.
Minorities consist of persons belonging to a group and
sharing a common culture, language, and/or religion. 126 Importantly,
minorities do not need to be recognized as such by the state in which
they reside, a qualification as a minority is entirely dependent on
objective characteristics. 127 In the past the Committee strictly
pegged indigenous peoples as minorities and evaded any question
on the applicability of the right to self-determination to indigenous
peoples, 12 8 but in more recent years the committee has started
124 Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 23: Article 27, Rights

of Minorities,
2-3.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.58 (1994). Also
preparatory documents to the human rights conventions demonstrate reluctance to
equate people and minorities. On discussing the definition of peoples and whether
or not it encompassed national groups, minorities or racial units inhabiting welldefined territories, it was thought that peoples should not be defined and must be
understood in its most general sense, and that "[f]urthennore, the right of
minorities was a separate problem". Draft international covenants on human rights
annotation by the Secretary-General, A/2929, 1 July 1955, §9.
125 There are few binding agreements on the topic. With regard to
indigenous
peoples, See Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382, 1384-85 (defining tribal
and indigenous people that Convention applied to); Int'l Convention on Civil and
Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 19, 1966, No. 14668 (conferring cultural, religious,
and linguistic freedom onto minorities); Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration
Committee, Opinion No. 2 § 2, Nov. 20, 1991 (stating International Law requires
states to respect rights of minorities).
126 General Comment No. 23: The Rights of Minorities (Art. 27), High Comm'r
H.R., § 5.1 (Aug. 4, 1994).
127 General Comment No. 23, § 5.2 (1994); Francesco Capotorti (Special
Rappoteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities), Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious, and
Linguistic Minorities,
30, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 (1979);
Interpretation of the Convention Respecting Reciprocal Emigration (Greece v.
Bulg.), Advisory Opinion, 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 17, at 21-23 (July 31).
128 General Comment No. 23, § 3.2, 7; Ominayak & Lubicon Lake Band
v.
Canada, No. 167/1984, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984, § 7, 32.1 (1990);
Kitok v. Sweden No. 197/1985, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985, § 4.1, 5.2,
6.3 (1988).
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referring to the relevance of the right of self-determination of
indigenous peoples as a means of interpretation of rights under
article 27 as minorities. 129 This evolution is also reflected in articles
3 and 4 of the U.N. Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

It is relevant whether migrants may qualify as a minority.
The HRC affirms this in the positive. 130 What is more, even visitors
to a state may qualify as a minority. 131 In order to temper this rather
liberal definition of the HRC, a-nevertheless low 132 -threshold of
permanence may be required of the migrants. If such permanence
would not be required at all, the rights of minorities would become
applicable to rather most any group of people and render the rights
of minorities void due to broadness and impracticality.
Minorities receive protection under article 27 of the ICCPR
to preserve their culture, language or religion as an individual
human right. 133 The state in whose territory the minority resides has
134
both negative and positive obligations to ensure this protection.
129

Concluding Observations, 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.112 (HRC 1999);

Concluding Observations, 15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/74/SWE (HRC 2002); see
also CERD General Recommendation No. 21, Right to Self-Determination (Aug.
23, 1996); Mahuika v. New Zealand, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993, § 9.2
(HRC 2000); An equal attitude was expressed in Diergaardt v. Namib., U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/63/D/760/1997, § 10.3 (HRC 1998). However, despite the softening of
the stance of HRC towards linking article 27 to the right to self-determination of
article 1 in its procedures under the Optional Protocol, true application of the right
to self-determination is still lacking.
130 General Comment No. 23, § 5.2 (1994); Though at times migrants
are
artificially distinguished from minorities due to the fact that they are deemed to
have migrated voluntarily, or due to a lack of (historical) relationship with the
state. Such considerations seem to spring more from political convenience rather
than legal argumentation. See Will Kymlicka, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A
LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1996); Daniel Smihula, RIGHTS OF
PERSONS BELONGING TO NATIONAL MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 95

(2008).
131

132

General Comment No. 23, § 5.2 (1994).
Article 27 ICCPR merely requests the minority to 'exist'. No particular degree

of permanence is requested. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
art. 27, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
133 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
134 General Comment No. 23, §§ 6.1, 6.2 (1994).
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For example, active measures of the state may be required to ensure
retention of culture of a minority. Even more so, it may be necessary
to ensure involvement of minorities in decisions which specifically
affect them. 135 To invoke such measures, the relevant group of
minorities does not need to be a citizen of the state in which the
minority group resides. 136 However, additional guarantees for
minorities to take part in public affairs and elections will only be
137
available if the minority member is a citizen of the relevant state.
Beyond minority rights as described within the scope of the ICCPR,
it may be possible for severely oppressed minorities to become
qualified as peoples having a right to external self-determination.
Such a right to external self-determination may materialize in the
form of seceding from a mother state. This right has been described
as "an altogether exceptional solution, a last resort when the State
lacks either the will or the power to enact and apply just and
effective guarantees'" 138 to ensure the rights of minorities.
It appears at the very least the islanders-as a totality of
inhabitants of a specific island nation today-can be viewed as a
people enjoying the right to self-determination as materialized in
their independence as a state. If the islanders were to move en masse
they would still objectively be able to qualify as a people and at the
very least as a minority in their new place of residence. As a people,
they would receive the right to internal self-determination and
political representation, alongside every other citizen of the state in
which they would reside. Additional, or as an alternative, to their
rights as a people, or separately, as a minority, the islanders would
139
have rights to support their culture, language and/or religion.

135

General Comment No. 23, § 7 (1994).

General Comment No. 23, § 5.1 (1994).
Int'l Convention on Civil and Political Rights art. 25, Dec. 19, 1966, No. 14668
(detailing rights of citizens and according this political right to "citizens" only).
138 Commission of Rapporteurs, ReportPresentedto the Council ofthe League of
136
137

Nations, 5, 10, L.N. Council Doc. B.7.21/68/106 (1921) (explaining Aaland
Islanders' right of external self-determination).
139 A full exploration on distinguishing a people from a minority goes beyond
the
scope of this article. See Raic for more on the subject. Raic puts forward the
uniqueness of a group of persons as the distinguishing factor. David Raic,
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Self-sufficient Peoplehood
In order to substantiate a right to self-determination with a
right to the use of their natural resources to further development,
islanders would preferably retain economic benefits from their
natural resources. 14 The issue here is that once their original island
territory wanes, so do baselines retract and maritime zones shrivel as
they are measured from such a retracted baseline. 141 This means that
to be self-reliant the maritime paradigm of land dominates the sea is
problematic. If it can be relinquished, it can enable islanders' retention of economically important maritime zones without continuing
existence of baselines. The last decade a development is visible of
stabilizing maritime zones and translating maritime boundaries into
agreements as much as possible in an attempt to congeal maritime
boundaries. Lately the trend has intensified. The latest bilateral and
trilateral agreements between several Pacific Island States-in
which they settle almost all their thus far disputed maritime boundaries-are exemplar. 142 In addition, in 2016 the Marshall Islands
declared all their maritime boundaries to the United Nations declaring the143exact locations of baselines and outer limits of their maritime
zones.
By doing this, the Marshall Islands hope to solidify their
STATEHOOD AND THE LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION (Kluwer Law International
2002).
140 For example, fishing-mostly in the form of granting fishing licenses to

foreign fishers-is one of the two main economic activities of Tuvalu. Andrea
Milan, Robert Oakes, and Jillian Campbell, TUVALU:
MIGRATION-RELATIONSHIPS

BETWEEN

MOBILITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT

HOUSEHOLD

CLIMATE CHANGE AND

VULNERABILITY,

HUMAN

No. 18. 28 (United Nations University

Institute for Environment and Human Security 2016).
141 See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 3, 5, 1982
(detailing state territorial sea measurement where art. 3 indicates that the territorial
sea has a breadth of 12 nautical miles as measured from the baseline and art. 5
states that the normal baseline is the low water line)
142 The agreements can be consulted in: Coalter Lathrop and the American society
of international law (eds.), INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, VOLUME VII
(Brill Nijhoff, 2016).
143 Republic of the Marshall Islands, Maritime Zones DeclarationAct, §§ 106-09,
111, 113, 114 (2016) (defining "Territorial Sea," "Internal Waters," "Archipelagic
Waters," "Contiguous Zone," "Continental Shelf," and "Maritime Zones").
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maritime boundaries dejure even if those zones would fluctuate or
disappear de facto. In a world of globalization and global governance, it is not unthinkable that maritime zones can be managed
perfectly well by other-than-state entities without a nearby territorial
basis to operate from, as much of the area today is chopped up into
exploration zones and governed by seabed mining companies with
the approval of the U.N. and set up by the International Seabed
Authority.
Empowerment of people is brought on by allowing them to
be self-reliant. 144 On a legal level, this can be done by provision of
self-determination and supporting the attached right of a people to
their natural resources. In addition, human security's credo is to ask
not what can we do but, how can we build on the efforts and
capabilities of those which are directly affected by the circumstances. 145 For the Small Island Developing States, this can mean
building on their capacities to form an asset to the host state if
transboundary migration becomes inevitable. Such a process of
'migration with dignity' has already begun on Kiribati 146 which
means to prep its residents by giving them the right skills to bode
well abroad. One of the goals of Kiribati's National Labour
Migration Policy (NLMP) which was created in cooperation with
the International Labour Organisation, is to "ensure that Kiribati as a
nation, culture and people will not perish as a result of climate
change." 147 This labour migration policy shows that islanders are
planning ahead, yet receive conflicting assistance. Whereas the ILO
has helped Kiribati develop its labour migration policy, much more
international cooperation is needed between the Pacific Islands and
potential host states.

144

Note on InternationalProtection, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/1024, § 63 (UNHCR

2006) (explaining benefits of self-reliance).
145 Commission on Human Security, HUMAN SECURITY Now 11-12 (2003).
146 Republic of Kiribati, Relocation, http://www.climate.gov.ki/category/action/
relocation/ (detailing Kiribati's "migration with dignity" plan).
147 KIRIBATI

NATIONAL

LABOUR

MIGRATION

POLICY

17,

http://www

.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Kiribati%/o20National%/o20Labouro20Migration% o2
OPolicy.pdf (2015).
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Getting Priorities Straight
Future scenarios for the islanders need to be assessed in light
of who the state serves, meaning its population. In this respect, I
would like to evoke the U.N. Secretary-General's speech indicating
that "[t]he State is now widely understood to be the servant of its
people, and not vice versa." 148 Human security translates the idea of
putting people first as is fit in a humanized international order. It
represents a novel view on the role of sovereignty and statehood and
puts state security in perspective. Irrespective of practical difficulties, replacement of territory seems a straightforward and functional
solution, if it is durable. The same cannot be said for deterritorialized solutions. On the recognition of a deterritorialized state,
McAdam states that "the continuing recognition of a non-existing
state is to some degree academic" 149 and I could not agree more. Not
only is a deterritorialized state incompatible with positive law on
statehood, retaining islanders in situ for as long as possible may lead
to rather quick, unstable and ad hoc approaches once territory finally
becomes entirely uninhabitable. This may bring on scattered migration resulting in diaspora, which after an initial period of continued
recognition as a deterritorialized state will likely lead to full integration in or assimilation with the host state, losing all avenues for
retaining the islanders' right to self-determination and their culture,
one of the biggest concerns of the islanders in relation to climate
change and migration.
Islanders will likely be better off focusing on the islanders'
needs instead of the island's needs. This can be reflected by
relinquishing the desire to uphold state security approaches at all
costs when it leads to virtual statehood. Human security as an
approach in today's humanized international legal world draws
attention to the islanders' needs going beyond mere individual
physical survival and aims for complete support of the islanders'
148

Secretary General, Annual Report to GeneralAssembly, http://www.un.org/

press/en/1999/19990920.sgsm7136.html (1999).
149 Jane McAdam, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION,
LAW 138 (2012).
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human right, here in particular the human right to self-determination.
This entails that self-determination is protected by providing
the islanders with land territory, most preferably (artificial) land in
the very spot their current island is found as the islanders' cultural
identity is closely tied to their territory. In this scenario, the
islanders' self-determination indeed still materializes in the form of
statehood which is in line with objective statehood criteria. The
willingness of the international community to cooperate on this
matter should be great as they wish to avoid even more migratory
issues. Should migration be unavoidable, staggered 150 and negotiated mass migration is the preferable solution. This way ties through
transnational communities with the new host community are slowly
built up and can be consolidated through a self-determination right
for the resettled islanders as a people or a minority with retention of
cultural identity.

In an attempt to stabilize life for displaced communities, transnational networks
of shared nationality or identity may provide a safety net for newcomers, as well
as being a channel for information. Commission on Human Security, HUMAN
SECURITY Now 51 (2003).
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